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Abstract
We provide a first formal analysis of the international rules that govern the use of subsidies to
domestic production.  Our analysis highlights the impact of the new disciplines on subsidies that
were added to GATT rules with the creation of the WTO.  Our results suggest that, although GATT
subsidy rules were typically viewed as weak and inadequate while the WTO subsidy rules are seen
as representing a significant strengthening of multilateral disciplines on subsidies, the key changes
introduced by the WTO subsidy rules may ultimately do more harm than good to the multilateral
trading system, by undermining the ability of tariff negotiations to serve as the mechanism for
expanding market access to more efficient levels.
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the University of Maryland and the University of Pennsylvania and especially Bill Ethier for helpful
comments.  We thank  the National Science Foundation for support.  Comments from a referee and
the Co-Editor greatly improved the paper.  An earlier draft of this paper, titled “Subsidy
Agreements,” was circulated as NBER Working Paper No. 10292.   Remaining errors are ours.
1I. Introduction
International disputes over subsidies are becoming an increasingly prominent feature of the
world trading system.  The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a successor to
GATT was nearly prevented by disputes in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations over the issue
of negotiating disciplines on agricultural subsidies, an issue which continues to plague the ongoing
Doha Round of WTO negotiations.  And ongoing disputes over subsidies that violate existing WTO
rules have led to the largest amount of authorized retaliation in GATT/WTO history.  Yet despite
their evident importance, the international rules that govern subsidies have received little attention
in the form of systematic economic analysis.  
Perhaps surprisingly, when viewed in the light shed by the existing theoretical literature on
domestic subsidies in trading economies, the notion of international agreements that seek to limit
the use of subsidies to domestic production looks immediately suspect.  After all, a central message
of the theory of distortions and welfare is the targeting principle (see Bhagwati and Ramaswami,
1963, and Johnson, 1965), under which the optimal intervention targets the affected margin directly.
According to this principle, production subsidies are almost always a preferred policy instrument
to tariffs.  This is because a production subsidy distorts only one margin (i.e., producer decisions),
and can therefore constitute a “first-best” instrument of intervention in the presence of production
distortions, whereas it is well-understood that a tariff distorts two margins (i.e., producer and
consumer decisions) and therefore almost never corresponds to first-best intervention.  In this light,
attempts to discipline the use of production subsidies appear misguided, if they simply redirect
government interventions toward the use of “second-best” instruments of intervention such as tariffs.
Of course, tariffs themselves have long been the subject of international agreements, with
tariff commitments comprising the traditional focus of GATT negotiations.  And the concern that,
if left unrestrained, the use of subsidies could thwart the impacts of negotiated tariff liberalization
has been a long-standing motivation for the continuing attempts by GATT/WTO member
governments to introduce “discipline” into the use of subsidies. But the subsidy disciplines that are
increasingly leading to disputes are in many ways more constraining of governments than the tariff
commitments they negotiate within the GATT/WTO.  At a basic level, this feature raises the concern
1Elsewhere (Bagwell and Staiger, 2001a), we examine the logic of GATT/WTO rules regarding export
subsidies.  At a casual level, it might be thought that our export subsidy results carry over to the case of production
subsidies, and therefore that an independent analysis of the international rules governing production subsidies is not
warranted.  Export subsidies, however, are distinct from production subsidies, and it is well-known that the economic
effects of the two forms of intervention are fundamentally different (export subsidies, like tariffs, distort producer and
consumer decisions).  Hence, there is good reason to expect (as we confirm below) that our analysis of export subsidies
bears little formal relation to an analysis of the international rules regarding subsidies to domestic production. 
2For example, as Jackson (1989, p. 259) points out, the 1979 GATT Subsidies Code observes that domestic
subsidies “...are widely used for the promotion of social and economic policy objectives,” and states that it is not the
intent of the Code “...to restrict the right of signatories to use such subsidies to achieve these and other important policy
objectives which they consider desirable.”  
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that the search for effective subsidy disciplines may have gotten off track, since it is a feature that
runs counter to what simple reliance on the targeting principle would suggest is warranted.  In any
event, to sort out these various concerns, what is needed is an analysis of the impacts of subsidy
disciplines of various designs in a setting where governments may also negotiate over tariffs.  
We provide a first formal analysis of the international rules that govern the use of subsidies
to domestic production.1  Our analysis highlights the impact of the new disciplines on subsidies that
were added to GATT rules with the creation of the WTO.  We work within a standard 2-country 2-
good competitive general equilibrium trade model, augmented to include government choices of
domestic production subsidies and also possibly domestic consumption taxes, in addition to tariffs.
Our modeling of government objectives extends Bagwell and Staiger (1999) to allow for domestic
production subsidies/consumption taxes, and is consistent with many possible underlying motives
for the imposition of a production subsidy, including the pursuit of distributive goals in the presence
of political economy motivations and the pursuit of allocative efficiency goals in the presence of
local (i.e., not trans-border) non-pecuniary externalities.  This is an important feature of the model,
as the long history of GATT/WTO attempts to discipline domestic subsidies has taken place against
the backdrop of explicit acknowledgment by member governments of the legitimate role of domestic
subsidies in government policy programs.2
Within this economic environment, we consider the possibility that governments might
implement internationally efficient policy choices (defined according to the objectives of each
government) with negotiations over tariffs alone, when they face either of two distinct sets of
3“disciplines” on their unilateral choices of domestic subsidy/tax levels, one set corresponding to
GATT subsidy rules and the other corresponding to WTO subsidy rules.  In this way, we seek first
to identify “weaknesses” in GATT subsidy disciplines that might prevent governments from
reaching the international efficiency frontier under GATT tariff negotiations, and then to gauge the
degree to which WTO subsidy rules might be seen as marking an improvement.
To represent the key features of GATT subsidy rules, we highlight the two central
mechanisms by which a government could respond to the subsidies of a trading partner prior to the
creation of the WTO:  “countervailing duty” (CVD) measures, and “non-violation” (NV)
nullification-or-impairment complaints.  More specifically, if the subsidy was offered to exporting
producers, then a government whose import-competing producers experienced material injury on
account of the subsidy (and whose import tariff on that product was legally bound in a GATT
agreement) could unilaterally impose a CVD against the subsidized imports.  If the subsidy was
instead offered to import-competing producers, then a government that had previously negotiated
a tariff binding on that product with the subsidizing government would have a legitimate basis for
making an NV claim concerning its market access rights, under which the subsidizing government
would then be expected to make a policy adjustment that returned market access to its original level
(though the government would be under no obligation to remove the subsidy).
A central question is whether governments have available a sufficiently rich set of domestic
instruments that they enjoy a degree of policy redundancy which can be exploited under tariff
negotiations.  In particular, as is well known, the effects of a tariff can be duplicated by a
combination production subsidy/consumption tax, and so a government that has access to tariffs as
well as a full set of production subsidies and consumption taxes enjoys a degree of policy
redundancy.  Assuming that this rich set of domestic instruments is available, we show that GATT
subsidy rules are sufficient to ensure that an internationally efficient policy combination will be
implemented under GATT tariff negotiations.  Moreover, we find that efficiency under GATT tariff
negotiations is attained even when responding to subsidies under GATT rules is allowed to be quite
costly.  Intuitively, governments can position tariffs in their negotiations so as to imply a level of
market access which yields an NV “trigger point” – a point beyond which further erosion of one
4country’s market access level would warrant initiation of a costly NV claim by its trading partner
in order to reinstate the negotiated market access level – set equal to the efficient level of market
access.  Subsequent to these negotiations, the level of market access is then allowed to “slip” back
to this trigger point through the unilateral choice of domestic subsidy and tax policies – and the
redundancy of policy instruments ensures that the conditions for domestic efficiency are not
disrupted in the process – but the threat of an NV claim beyond this point keeps market access levels
from falling below their efficient levels.  
We turn next to the WTO subsidy rules, the main features of which are reflected in the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM).  When applied within the context of
our model, we argue that the key innovation of the SCM Agreement relative to GATT subsidy rules
is that, in addition to its rights under the GATT subsidy rules, any government now has the added
right to challenge – and, in principle, force the removal of – virtually any positive subsidy.
Maintaining our assumption that governments have sufficient instruments to enjoy a degree of policy
redundancy, an implication of our finding regarding the efficiency of GATT subsidy rules is of
course that the subsidy rules of the WTO cannot possibly mark an improvement in this setting.  Still,
it might be conjectured that the WTO subsidy rules, in providing governments with the ability to
challenge and remove a domestic instrument (subsidy) which is in any event redundant, will at least
do no harm.  We show, however, that this conjecture is incorrect: a range of efficient outcomes that
were attainable under GATT subsidy rules are unattainable under the subsidy rules of the WTO.
Intuitively, the redundancy of policy instruments is utilized to achieve efficient outcomes through
tariff negotiations under the institutional constraints of the GATT subsidy rules, and by introducing
the potential that this redundancy will be removed, the WTO subsidy rules interfere with the ability
of governments to structure their tariff negotiations so as to achieve efficient policy combinations.
Finally, we consider a world in which the only domestic instrument is a production subsidy,
and so the policy redundancy featured above does not arise.  Because it simply eliminates
redundancy, this instrument restriction does not alter the welfare combinations that correspond to
the efficiency frontier.  But as we demonstrate, the elimination of policy redundancy has important
implications for negotiated tariff outcomes under GATT and WTO subsidy rules.  
5First, as can be anticipated from our description just above, in this  limited-instrument world,
the lack of policy redundancy interferes with the ability of governments to attain the efficiency
frontier under GATT subsidy rules.  In fact, if NV claims are costly, the lack of policy redundancy
in this limited-instrument world prevents governments from attaining any point on the efficiency
frontier under GATT subsidy rules, so that tariff negotiations under GATT subsidy rules are sure
to lead to policy outcomes that are internationally inefficient.  Second, the inefficiency under GATT
subsidy rules raises at least the possibility that WTO subsidy rules could then mark an improvement,
and we show that this is indeed possible provided that the use of subsidies is of sufficiently minor
importance on the efficiency frontier.  And third, we show that if the importance of domestic
subsidies is instead sufficiently pronounced on the efficiency frontier, then WTO subsidy rules can
be seen to mark a “step backward” relative to GATT subsidy rules in a limited-instrument costly-NV
world.  In fact, we describe circumstances in which the WTO subsidy rules will completely
undermine the ability of tariff negotiations to provide governments with an avenue of escape from
the non-cooperative (Nash) equilibrium, and in these circumstances GATT subsidy rules must surely
lead to more efficient outcomes than WTO subsidy rules.
When taken together, our results signal a note of caution about the direction in which the
WTO is moving on the issue of domestic subsidies.  GATT subsidy rules were typically viewed as
weak and inadequate, while the WTO subsidy rules are seen as representing a significant
strengthening of multilateral disciplines on subsidies.  However, our results indicate that the key
changes introduced by the WTO subsidy rules may ultimately do more harm than good to the
multilateral trading system, by undermining the ability of tariff negotiations to serve as the
mechanism for expanding market access to more efficient levels.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II develops the model, and characterizes
the GATT/WTO bargaining frontier.  Section III evaluates the efficiency properties of the GATT
subsidy rules, while section IV considers the WTO subsidy rules.  Section V turns to a world of
limited instruments, and re-evaluates the performance of GATT and WTO subsidy rules in this
environment.  Section VI offers a brief conclusion. 
3As only the price of x relative to the price of y matters in our general equilibrium setting, it is immaterial
whether these policy interventions take place in the import-competing sector or the export sector, and we concentrate
all interventions in the import-competing sector.
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II.  The Model
Our starting point is the 2-country 2-good competitive general equilibrium trade model
adapted to allow for the possibility of both tariff and production subsidy/consumption tax choices.
To establish our main points simply, we introduce non-trade policies into the home country only,
so that the home government may choose both a tariff level and a level for its production subsidy
and its consumption tax, while the foreign government has only a tariff choice to make.  
II.1:  The Basic Trade Model
We assume that the home country exports good y to the foreign country in exchange for
imports of good x.  Beginning with home country magnitudes, let  denote one plus the ad valorem
production subsidy offered to producers of good x in the home country (so that   ( ) reflects
a production subsidy (tax)), and similarly let  denote one plus the ad valorem consumption tax
imposed on consumption of good x in the home country (so that   ( ) reflects a consumption
tax (subsidy)).3  We denote the domestic producer price of good x (inclusive of the producer
tax/subsidy) by  and the domestic consumer price of good x (inclusive of the consumer
tax/subsidy) by .  The domestic (producer and consumer) price of good y is denoted by , with
the ratio of domestic producer and consumer prices then given by  and ,
respectively.  Finally, let  denote one plus the ad valorem tariff imposed on imports of good x into
the home country (so that   ( ) reflects an import tax (subsidy)).  All net (positive or
negative) revenues generated by these instruments are distributed lump sum across domestic
consumers.
Turning to the foreign country, our assumption that the foreign government has only a tariff
at its disposal simplifies the description of the foreign economy.  Let  denote one plus the ad
valorem tariff imposed on foreign imports of good y (so that   ( ) reflects an import tax
(subsidy)), where here and throughout “*” is used to denote foreign variables.  We denote the local
(consumer and producer) price of good x relative to good y in the foreign country by .  All net
4In the domestic country, for example, international arbitrage implies that the before-tax price of good x faced
by domestic consumers, , is equal to , the before-tax price of an imported unit of good x.  This implies that
 as stated in the text.  Domestic producers of good x must meet the competition for domestic consumers from
foreign suppliers, and so the before-subsidy price collected by domestic producers of good x, , must by international
arbitrage be equal to , which implies  as stated in the text. 
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tax revenues from the use of the foreign tariff are distributed lump sum across foreign  consumers.
The relative “world price” (i.e., the relative exporter price  or terms of trade) is denoted
by .  Under the maintained assumption that tariffs are non-prohibitive, international arbitrage
links each country’s local prices to the world price in light of its tariff according to
,  and .4
The foreign import demand and export supply functions may be written as functions of the
local relative price in the foreign country and the world price, and we denote these functions by
 and , respectively. In an analogous fashion, the home-country import
demand and export supply functions may be written as functions of the local relative producer price 
and consumer price  in the home country and the world price .  We denote these functions as
 and , respectively.  With the relevant functions defined, the home and foreign
budget constraints may then be written as 
(1) ,
(2) .
The equilibrium world price, , is determined by market clearing for good x, 
(3) ,
where we have made explicit the dependence of the local producer prices  (consumer prices)  on the
producer subsidy (consumption tax) and tariffs and the world price.  Market clearing for good y is
then implied by (1), (2) and (3).  
Using the market-clearing condition (3), it may be confirmed that an increase in the tariff has
the same impact on the market-clearing world price as does a combined increase in both the
5We also assume throughout that these objective functions are everywhere differentiable and globally concave
in the policy variables.  
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production subsidy and consumption tax by the same percentage.  This, of course, reflects the
equivalence between a tariff and a combination production subsidy/consumption tax.  As we will
see, the implied policy redundancy for the home government – that any one of its three policy
instruments is redundant in light of the other two – plays an important role in what follows.   
We assume that the Marshall-Lerner stability conditions are met, so that an inward shift of
the home (foreign) import demand curve results in a lower (higher) equilibrium world price.  We
also assume that Metzler/Lerner-type Paradoxes are ruled out, so that ,
,  and . 
Finally, we represent the objectives of the home and foreign governments with the general
functions  and , respectively.  We assume that, holding its local prices fixed,
each government would prefer an improvement in its terms of trade: 
(4)  and  .
According to (4), governments like transfers of revenue from their trading partners.  We place no
other restrictions on the objectives of each government, although implicitly our representation of
government objectives rules out non-pecuniary trans-border externalities that could interact with the
choice of tariffs or production subsidies/consumption taxes.5   
As we do not place restrictions on how a government feels about changes in its local prices,
our representation of government preferences is very general, and is consistent with formal models
of government policy determination in a wide variety of settings (see Bagwell and Staiger, 1999,
for a discussion of this in the context of tariff determination).  Of particular relevance for the present
discussion is the fact that our model is consistent with many possible underlying motives for the
imposition of a production subsidy in the home country, including the pursuit of distributive goals
in the presence of political economy motivations and the pursuit of allocative efficiency goals in the
presence of local (i.e., not trans-border) non-pecuniary externalities.  As we observed in the
6This is not to say that international subsidy agreements could not be evaluated on the basis of some alternative
criterion.  For example, international subsidy agreements might be valuable to governments as a way of altering their
interactions with their own citizens, rather than as a way of altering their interactions with other governments as is the
case in our analysis here.  For a broader discussion of these two approaches to understanding the role of international
trade agreements more generally, see Bagwell and Staiger (2002).
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Introduction, this is an important feature of the model, as the long history of GATT/WTO attempts
to discipline domestic subsidies has taken place against the backdrop of explicit acknowledgment
by member governments of the legitimate role of domestic subsidies in government policy programs.
II.2: The GATT/WTO Contracting Frontier 
We next define the international efficiency frontier.  To this end, let  denote any feasible
level of foreign welfare, i.e, any level of  for which there exists some  such that
.  We define the international efficiency frontier by the
combinations of  which, for each , solve:
s.t. .
Notice that the international efficiency frontier is defined with respect to the governments’ own
objective functions which, as we have observed above, may include political economy
considerations.  In what follows we evaluate various approaches to the treatment of subsidies in
international trade agreements on the basis of whether these approaches allow governments to
achieve a position on the international efficiency frontier so defined.  As we discuss more broadly
in Bagwell and Staiger (2002), this seems an appropriate criterion in the context of the GATT/WTO,
as the GATT/WTO is an organization that facilitates the negotiation of trading arrangements that
are mutually beneficial to its members (i.e., the member governments).6 
It is straightforward to show that the non-cooperative (Nash) policy choices of the two
governments do not achieve a point on the international efficiency frontier.  Hence, there are
potential gains to the home and foreign government from international negotiations.  In what follows
we restrict attention to points on the international efficiency frontier at which, with its trading
partner’s policies fixed, each government would like to raise its own tariff.  This restricted attention
seems appropriate given our focus on the GATT/WTO, where governments evidently view their own
10
tariff reductions as “concessions” to be offered only in exchange for something of value (such as
concessions of a reciprocal nature) from their trading partners.  Formally, we state this condition as:
(C1) .
In subsequent sections, when we ask whether various negotiating games can deliver efficient
outcomes, we will restrict attention to efficient outcomes which satisfy (C1).  We refer to this
restricted portion of the international efficiency frontier as the Contracting Frontier.  
Points on the Contracting Frontier exhibit two important properties that prove useful for our
analysis, and so we record these properties in a pair of lemmas, which we prove in the Appendix:
Lemma 1: Let  denote a point on the Contracting Frontier, and let
.  Then for any , .
Lemma 2:  Let  denote a point on the Contracting Frontier, and let
 and  for any ,  and .  Then for any ,  and
 implying , .
Together, Lemmas 1 and 2 indicate that, beginning from a point on the Contracting Frontier:
(i) the foreign government dislikes any changes in the trade and/or domestic  policies of the home
government that reduce ; while (ii) the home government dislikes any changes in its own
domestic policies combined with a weakly higher foreign tariff that together increase .  We
emphasize that these predictions do not follow directly from the structure we have placed on
government objectives in (4), which refers only to the partial effect of how governments feel about
-movements (when their local prices are held fixed).  That from a position on the Contracting
Frontier the direction of -movements implied by various combinations of policy changes is
predictive of how governments feel about these policy changes in total is a feature that will turn out
to be useful in our analysis of subsidy agreements.  We begin that analysis in the next section.
III. The GATT Subsidy Rules
III.1 Institutional Background
Throughout GATT’s history, subsidies have posed perplexing and difficult issues for
7If the importing country’s tariff on that product were unbound, then it could respond to the subsidy with any
tariff level it wished., though in contrast to a countervailing duty (which would also be available to it) this tariff response
could not discriminate against imports of the product coming from the subsidizing country.  
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international trade agreements.  Jackson (1989, p. 269) describes the issues this way:
“...the whole area of subsidy activity in international law, including the rules designed to constrain the use of subsidies
and the other rules designed to allow national governments the unilateral privilege of responding to subsidies with
countervailing duties, is not only extremely complex but holds the potential, if misapplied, of undermining the basic
policy goals of the post- World War II liberal trade system.  On the one hand, governments can use subsidies to evade
a liberal trade system by subsidizing so as to inhibit imports, or by subsidizing so as to enhance exports.  On the other
hand, responses to subsidies, particularly the unilateral national government response of countervailing duties, can be
implemented in such a way as to undermine liberal trade policies...”
As Sykes (forthcoming) describes, there were several attempts made to strengthen GATT
subsidy rules prior to the advent of the WTO, but in effect governments remained essentially free
under GATT to offer production subsidies to their producers as they wished (possibly subject to
some reporting requirements).  The allowable responses to these production subsidies from other
governments under GATT rules were more restricted, and could in effect take one of two forms,
depending on whether the production subsidy was offered to exporting producers – and so enhanced
exports – or instead to import-competing producers – and so inhibited imports.  
If the subsidy was offered to exporting producers, then as Sykes (forthcoming) describes a
government whose import-competing producers experienced “material injury” on account of the
subsidy (and whose import tariff on that product was legally bound in a GATT agreement) could
unilaterally impose an additional “countervailing duty” (CVD) against the subsidized imports.  The
magnitude of the CVD response was limited to be no larger than the amount of the subsidy.7  
If the subsidy was instead offered to import-competing producers, then as Sykes
(forthcoming) explains a government that had previously negotiated a tariff binding on that product
with the subsidizing government would have a legitimate basis for making a “non-violation” (NV)
nullification-or-impairment claim concerning its market access rights (provided that it could claim
8The conditions under which a subsidy could be said to upset market access expectations were clarified  in
several early GATT Working Party and Panel reports, and effectively cover the introduction of any new or increased
subsidy that diminishes access and was not previously included in a GATT schedule (Petersmann, 1997, pp. 151-154).
9An additional limitation of GATT subsidy disciplines which is emphasized by Sykes (forthcoming) was their
inability to address third-country issues.  These issues do not arise in our 2-country model, but we return to consider them
further in the concluding section.   
10Implicitly, we are assuming that GATT commitments are enforced.  In fact, GATT enforcement mechanisms
were notoriously weak, and the WTO took important steps to rectify this weakness.  We abstract from issues of
enforcement in our formal analysis, to focus on differences in subsidy disciplines across the GATT and the WTO. 
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that its market access expectations had been upset by the new subsidy).8  In response to such a claim,
the subsidizing government would then be expected to make a policy adjustment that returned
market access to its original level (though the government would be under no obligation to remove
the subsidy).  More generally, as Petersmann (1997, pp. 142-170) explains, in principle NV claims
can be associated with any governmental measure (e.g., consumption taxes), not just the introduction
of new production subsidies, though as Petersmann describes the role of NV claims has been most
clearly established in GATT case law as these claims relate to production subsidies.  Nevertheless,
even when applied to subsidies, the legal ambiguities associated with the notion of “non-violation”
complaints are considerable, and have made reliance on NV claims as a subsidy disciplining device
controversial from the beginning.  The resulting frustration has helped to fuel the long-standing
attempts to reform subsidy disciplines in the GATT/WTO.9 
Against this institutional background, we now pose the following question: Could
governments who negotiate tariff commitments and are then free to set their domestic subsidy/tax
instruments as they wish be expected to achieve internationally efficient policy outcomes, when they
are permitted to respond to production subsidies (and in the case of NV claims, consumption taxes
as well) as we have described these allowable responses just above?  To answer this question, we
next define a negotiation game that captures the features described above.  The general features of
the GATT Subsidy Game are as follows:10
Stage 1: The home and foreign governments negotiate tariff levels , and a stage-1 market-
clearing world price  is implied by  and the existing domestic subsidy
and tax policies . 
11Governments negotiate bindings on their tariffs in the GATT/WTO, and these bindings represent maximum
levels beyond which a government’s applied tariffs cannot legally rise.  For simplicity, and to focus on the main points,
we make no distinction between the applied tariffs and the bindings negotiated in stage 1 of the GATT Subsidy Game,
but this distinction can be introduced without altering our results.  We observe as well that, owing to the policy
redundancy noted above, if the foreign government had no ability to respond to the stage-2 domestic policy choices of
the home government (i.e., if there were no stage 3), then the home government would attain a point on its best-response
function with its stage-2 choices, and an efficient combination of policies satisfying (C1) cannot be achieved.
12This definition conforms to the notion of market access in the GATT/WTO (see WTO, 2004, for a recent and
illuminating discussion of the concept of market access).  GATT Panels have made a clear distinction between market
access and export volume (Petersmann, 1997, p. 141), noting that market access refers to the “conditions of competition”
between imported and domestic products.  This is reflected in our formal definition of market access above by evaluating
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Stage 2: The home government chooses domestic policies , and a stage-2 market-clearing world
price  is implied. 
Stage 3: If the conditions for a successful NV claim are met, then the foreign government chooses
whether or not to make an NV claim; if the conditions for a CVD response are met, then the
foreign government chooses whether or not to impose a CVD.
In effect, the GATT Subsidy Game has the two governments negotiating over tariffs, with
the home government then free to set unilaterally its domestic production subsidy and consumption
tax levels, and the foreign government free to respond to the domestic policy choices within the
limits established by GATT rules.11  In the next subsection, we further develop the specific features
of the GATT Subsidy Game, and derive a benchmark result. 
III.2 The Efficiency of Outcomes under GATT Subsidy Rules
We begin our analysis of the GATT Subsidy Game by considering in more detail the
implications of GATT rules for the allowable responses of the foreign government in stage 3.
Consider first the condition for a successful NV claim.  As described above, a legitimate basis for
an NV claim by the foreign government arises whenever the home government has bound a tariff
in a GATT negotiation with the foreign government, and then subsequently alters its domestic
policies in a way that diminishes the market access implied by that original tariff negotiation.
To formalize this condition,  we follow Bagwell and Staiger (2001b) and define the market
access that a country provides to its trading partner by the volume of imports it would accept at a
particular world price.12  In particular, let us define the domestic market access implied by the stage-
import volume at a particular world (i.e., exporter) price.  We may think of the conditions of competition between
imported and domestic products as remaining stable as long as a particular exporter price would continue to bring forth
the same volume of import demand. 
13In response to an NV claim, the home government could also adjust (reduce) its tariff, but the policy
redundancy for the home government allows us to focus on adjustments to  with no loss of generality.    We model
NV claims here as preserving the level of market access commitments implied by tariff negotiations.  More accurately,
in combination with renegotiation rights the NV claims operate to preserve the balance of market access commitments
implied by tariff negotiations.  We discuss the extension of our results to this setting in the concluding section.
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1 tariff negotiation as the domestic import volume implied by the stage-1 tariff choice and the
existing domestic subsidy and tax policies, evaluated at the market-clearing world price implied in
stage 1, or .  Next, we define the domestic market access implied by the
stage-2 policy choices as the domestic import volume implied by the stage-1 tariff choice and the
stage-2 domestic subsidy and tax policy choices,  evaluated again at the market-clearing world price
implied in stage 1, or .  With these definitions,  it may then be said that
the condition for a successful NV claim by the foreign government is met if and only if
.  But using the market-clearing condition
(3) and the Marshall-Lerner stability condition, this condition is equivalent to . 
Having formalized the condition for a successful NV claim, we next ask when the foreign
government would choose to make an NV claim, if the condition for success were in place.  To
answer this question, we first observe that the home government is obliged under a successful NV
claim to make a policy adjustment that returns market access to its original level.  Following a
successful NV claim, then, we allow the home government to select its preferred  consistent
with the original market access level.13  But by (3), it may now also be observed that the effect of
a successful NV claim is to return the market-clearing world price to its implied stage-1 level .
Figure 1 illustrates.  With the world price measured on the vertical axis and the quantity of
good x measured on the horizontal axis, the home-country import demand curve and the foreign-
country export supply curve associated with the stage-1 tariff negotiations are labeled  and ,
respectively.  The domestic market access implied by the stage-1 tariff negotiation is labeled
.  A reduction in the domestic market access implied by the stage-2 policy choices to the
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level labeled  would be associated with an inward-shift of the home-country import demand
curve to that labeled .  The associated stage-2 market clearing world price is labeled  and, as
Figure 1 depicts,  implies .  By inducing the home government to select a 
consistent with the original market access level , a successful NV claim shifts the home-
country import demand curve back out through the point  in Figure 1, and returns
the market-clearing world price to its implied stage-1 level .       
As a consequence of these observations, we may conclude that the foreign government gains
from exercising a right to make an NV claim if and only if .
We may therefore state:
Lemma 3: The foreign government makes an NV claim in stage 3 of the GATT Subsidy Game if
and only if (i) , and (ii) . 
Consider next the condition for a CVD response.  As described in the previous subsection,
under GATT rules the foreign government can unilaterally impose a CVD on imports from the home
country whenever it can establish that its import-competing industry suffers material injury as a
result of a subsidy offered by the domestic government to domestic exporting firms.  We formalize
this by requiring that, for a foreign CVD response to be permissible, the home government must
have with its stage-2 choice increased the production subsidy it offers to its exporting firms relative
to the stage-1 level, and the implied output in the foreign import-competing sector must contract
between stages 1 and 2 as a result.  In our general equilibrium setting, a production subsidy offered
to domestic exporting firms implies , and a rise in the production subsidy offered to the domestic
exporting firms implies , while the output of the foreign import-competing sector  contracts
between stages 1 and 2 if and only if , which is equivalent to . 
Observing that the foreign government will exercise an opportunity to impose a CVD if and
only if its tariff is bound below its best-response level, or , we may therefore state:
Lemma 4: The foreign government chooses to impose a CVD in stage 3 of the GATT Subsidy
Game if and only if (i) , (ii) , and (iii) . 
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With the foreign government’s stage-3 responses in the GATT Subsidy Game characterized
by Lemmas 3 and 4, we now ask whether the GATT Subsidy Game can deliver internationally
efficient outcomes.  To explore this possibility, we follow Bagwell and Staiger (2001b) and ask
whether points on the efficiency frontier can be reached with appropriate stage-1 outcomes, in light
of the subsequent (stage-2 and stage-3) outcomes that may be anticipated.  Given the existing
production and consumption policies of the home government, we say that a particular pair of
payoffs for the home  and foreign governments can be implemented under GATT tariff negotiations
if there exists a pair of negotiated tariff levels  such that this payoff pair corresponds to a
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SGPE) of stages 2 and 3 of the GATT Subsidy Game.
Consider, then, any policy combination  on the Contracting Frontier.  As we
observed in section II.1, there is a degree of policy redundancy for the home government, in the
sense that any one of its three policy instruments is redundant in light of the other two.  We now
exploit this policy redundancy and observe that the efficient payoffs associated with 
can be equivalently delivered with the alternative (efficient) policy combination
 for any .  Define , and define  implicitly by
.  In words,  is the domestic tariff level that, in combination with the foreign
tariff  and the existing domestic subsidy and tax policies , implies the market-clearing
world price  (and the efficient domestic market access level).  Finally, let .  Then the
efficient policy combination   is equivalent to the alternative (efficient) policy
combination .
We now claim that the pair of payoffs for the home and foreign governments associated with
the policy combination  can be implemented under GATT tariff negotiations.  To
establish this claim, we suppose that stage-1 negotiations result in the tariff pair , so
that the market access levels implied by these initial choices are efficient and the implied stage-1
market-clearing world price is .  We then show that this payoff pair corresponds to a SGPE
of stages 2 and 3 of the GATT Subsidy Game.  The candidate equilibrium entails home government
stage-2 choices of , and no stage-3 claims/responses by the foreign government.
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To establish that this candidate equilibrium is indeed a SGPE of stages 2 and 3 of the GATT
Subsidy Game when stage-1 negotiations result in the tariff pair , consider the home
government’s stage-2 problem.  If it selects , then it has selected an efficient mix
of policies to deliver its efficient market access level, the implied stage-2 market-clearing world
price is , and by Lemmas 3 and 4 there can be no stage-3 response from the foreign
government.  Hence, if the home government’s stage-2 choice is , then the welfare
levels associated with the efficient policy combination  will be implemented.
Suppose, then, that the home government’s stage-2 choice deviates from this candidate
equilibrium and instead is . Then there are three possibilities.  A first
possibility is that, under the alternative stage-2 choice, the domestic market access level remains
unchanged so that it is still true that , and therefore by Lemmas 3 and 4 it is still the case
that there can be no stage-3 response from the foreign government.  But then the foreign government
is indifferent between  and , so that a strict preference for 
by the home government would be inconsistent with the efficiency of .  A second
possibility is that, under the alternative stage-2 choice, the domestic market access level is reduced,
so that .  But then by Lemmas 1 and 3, the foreign government will choose in stage 3
to make an NV claim, and the home government must then select its preferred  consistent with
, and can do no better than to select the (efficient) combination
.  The third and final possibility is that, under the alternative stage-2 choice, the
domestic market access level is increased, so that .  Under this possibility, there can be
no stage-3 NV claim by Lemma 3.  By Lemma 4 there might be a stage-3 CVD imposed by the
foreign government, and with  this would have the effect of increasing  further above
.  But in any event, by Lemma 2 the home government cannot achieve higher welfare under this
(higher ) possibility.  Hence we may state:
Proposition 1: Any point on the Contracting Frontier can be implemented under GATT tariff
negotiations. 
Proposition 1 asserts that the GATT-permissible responses to production subsidies (and
14As our proof of Proposition 1 demonstrates, it is possible to implement any point on the Contracting Frontier
without altering the implied domestic market access between stages 1 and 2 and thus without triggering an NV claim
along the equilibrium path.  Hence, while we have appealed to GATT rulings (see note 8) and treated as unexpected any 
that diminishes the implied domestic market access between stages 1 and 2, this treatment would also be consistent with
a more game-theoretic approach of defining unexpected as “off-equilibrium.”
15Under the natural assumption that disagreement in the stage-1 tariff negotiations  of the GATT Subsidy Game
leads to non-cooperative (Nash) policy choices for both governments, there is no incentive for the home government to
manipulate its initial subsidy and tax choices to position disagreement payoffs either. 
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consumption taxes) are sufficient to allow internationally efficient outcomes to be achieved with
negotiations over tariffs alone.  Since, according to Proposition 1, any point on the Contracting
Frontier can be implemented under GATT tariff negotiations, it follows that any (frictionless) stage-
1 bargaining procedure over tariffs will achieve an internationally efficient policy outcome.
Intuitively, the rules that delineate the permissible responses evidently strike the right balance
between, on the one hand, providing governments with the responses necessary to prevent their
trading partners from making domestic policy choices that would preclude attainment of the
international efficiency frontier and, on the other hand, not being so permissive as to allow the
responses themselves to become the impediment to efficient outcomes.14 
Notice that, in establishing Proposition 1, we have said nothing about how the “existing”
domestic subsidy and tax policies  are determined.  This raises a potential concern that
allowing to be chosen by the home government before the initiation of the GATT Subsidy
Game – in anticipation of the upcoming negotiations according to the GATT Subsidy Game – could
undercut the ability of this game to deliver governments to the Contracting Frontier (and hence
undercut our Proposition 1).  However, Proposition 1 is proven for any initial subsidy and tax levels,
and so allowing the home government to choose its subsidies and taxes prior to the initiation of the
GATT Subsidy Game has no effect on our proposition; in particular the GATT Subsidy Game
continues to deliver governments to the Contracting Frontier. The reason is that, whatever the initial
subsidy and tax levels, the Stage-1 tariff negotiations secure tariff levels that, together with these
initial subsidies and taxes, imply the desired equilibrium world price. And once Stage 1 negotiations
have been completed and a world price is thereby implied, the initial subsidy and tax levels are
irrelevant to the later stages of the game.15 
16If more than one value of  exists, then we define  to be the lowest such value.  From the definition of
, if NV is costless, then .  When NV is costly, we have that  by the definition of  and Lemma 1.
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Interestingly, as the arguments leading up to Proposition 1 reveal, there is an important role
for the possibility of NV claims in supporting efficient negotiating outcomes, but there appears to
be no need for the possibility of CVD responses to guide governments to the Contracting Frontier
(that is, the possibility of a stage-3 CVD response could be made costly or even removed entirely
from the GATT Subsidy Game without altering the validity of Proposition 1).  But in light of the
role played by NV claims in supporting efficient outcomes in the GATT Subsidy Game, it is
important to ask whether this role would be diminished or even eliminated once the costs of bringing
a successful NV claim are introduced.  After all, as we observed in section III.1, the many attempts
to impose further disciplines on the use of subsidies which culminated in the WTO SCM Agreement
can be interpreted as reflecting in large part the frustration associated with the high costs of using
the legally ambiguous NV claim for this purpose.  We therefore turn in the next subsection to
consider the implications for Proposition 1 of introducing a cost to the NV claim.
III.3 Costly NV Claims and the Efficiency of Outcomes under GATT Subsidy Rules
We maintain our focus on the GATT Subsidy Game, but now introduce a cost to making an
NV claim.  We assume that the cost is borne by the claimant (i.e., the foreign government), and
depict the welfare level of the foreign government as  when it makes an NV claim
and faces local foreign prices  and market-clearing world price .  We will say that the NV
claim is costly at prices  and  if and only if .  An NV claim is
costless at prices  and  if and only if .
The only limit we place on the magnitude of the NV cost is as follows.  For any combination
of policies  on the Contracting Frontier, and with , we assume
that there exists a  satisfying .16  Our assumption
on the allowable magnitude of NV cost implies that the cost of NV cannot rise so high that there is
no level of  that would make the foreign government indifferent between, on the one hand, paying
the NV cost and trading at the terms of trade , and on the other hand, not paying the NV cost
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but trading at the terms of trade .  Recalling now by Lemma 1 that, for any , we also
have , it follows that, whether or not NV is costly at prices
 and ,  for any
.  We may therefore state the analogue of Lemma 1 when NV claims are costly:
Lemma 5: Let  denote a point on the Contracting Frontier, let ,
and let  be defined by .  Then for any ,
.
Introducing a cost to making an NV claim alters our previous analysis of the GATT Subsidy
Game in only one way: the condition under which the foreign government gains from exercising a
right to make an NV claim must be reconsidered.  As before, the home government is obliged under
a successful NV claim to make a policy adjustment that returns market access to its original level.
To simplify and focus on the main point, we assume as well that the foreign export supply function
is invariant to the filing of an NV claim. (We thus rule out the possibility that the foreign export
supply function is altered in the process of making an NV claim by, for example, diverting resources
from production of the export good to developing the NV claim.)  With this assumption, it again
follows by (3) that the effect of a successful NV claim is to return the market-clearing world price
to its implied stage-1 level .  Hence, the foreign government gains from making a successful NV
claim if and only if .  We may therefore state the
analogue of Lemma 3 when NV claims are costly:
Lemma 6: The foreign government makes a costly NV claim in stage 3 of the GATT Subsidy Game
if and only if (i) , and (ii) .
As we continue to assume that a CVD response is costless, Lemma 4 continues to
characterize the circumstances under which the foreign government chooses to impose a CVD in
stage 3 of the GATT Subsidy Game.  Armed with Lemmas 4, 5 and 6, we may now ask whether the
GATT Subsidy Game can deliver efficient outcomes when the NV claim is costly.  
Consider, then, any policy combination  on the Contracting Frontier.  Define 
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implicitly by , and let .  In words,  is the domestic tariff level that,
in combination with the foreign tariff  and the existing domestic subsidy and tax policies ,
implies the market-clearing world price .  Then the efficient policy combination  
is equivalent to the alternative (efficient) policy combination . 
Now suppose that stage-1 negotiations result in the tariff pair , so that the
implied stage-1 market-clearing world price is then .  Notice that when NV is costly,  
and so these stage-1 negotiations result in the home government offering to bind its tariff at a level
that implies a greater level of market access at  than is efficient.  Consider the home
government’s stage-2 problem.  If it selects , then its domestic policy choices have
reduced its market access to the efficient level at , and the implied stage-2 market-clearing world
price is , with  and hence  when NV is costly.  By Lemma 4, then, there can
be no stage-3 CVD response from the foreign government.  And by Lemma 6 and the definition of
, there will be no NV claim against the home government.  Hence, if the home government’s
stage-2 choice is , then the welfare levels associated with the efficient policy
combination  will be implemented.
To see that the home government cannot do better than this candidate equilibrium with an
alternative stage-2 selection, suppose that its stage-2 choice is .  Then there
are three possibilities.  A first possibility is that, under the alternative stage-2 choice, domestic
market access remains at its efficient level, so that it is still true that .  But then the foreign
government is indifferent between  and , so that a strict preference for
 by the home government would be inconsistent with the efficiency of .
A second possibility is that, under the alternative stage-2 choice, domestic market access is reduced
below its efficient level, so that .  But then by Lemmas 5 and 6, the foreign government will
choose in stage 3 to make an NV claim, and the home government must then select its preferred 
consistent with , which by Lemma 2 implies that the home government then
does strictly worse.  The third and final possibility is that, under the alternative stage-2 choice,
domestic market access is maintained above its efficient level, so that .  But whether or not
there is a (CVD) response from the foreign government, under this third possibility the home
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government must face a market-clearing world price higher than , and by Lemma 2 therefore
does strictly worse.  Hence we may state:
Proposition 2: Whether or not NV claims are costly, any point on the Contracting Frontier can be
implemented under GATT tariff negotiations.
According to Proposition 2, the costs of an NV claim can potentially be quite high without
interfering with the ability of governments to implement efficient policy combinations under GATT
tariff negotiations.  Intuitively, the redundancy of policy instruments indicated by the possibility of
using tariffs, production subsidies and consumption taxes allows governments to position tariffs in
their negotiations so as to imply a level of market access which yields an NV “trigger point” at the
efficient level of market access.  Subsequent to these negotiations, the level of market access is then
allowed along the equilibrium path to “slip” back to this trigger point through the unilateral choice
of domestic subsidy and tax policies – and the redundancy of policy instruments ensures that the
conditions for domestic efficiency are not disrupted in the process – but the threat of NV beyond this
point keeps market access levels from falling below their internationally efficient levels.  
An implication of Proposition 2's assertion that GATT subsidy rules can continue to deliver
internationally efficient policy outcomes even when the (potentially very high) costs of NV claims
are acknowledged is that the subsidy rules of the WTO cannot possibly mark an improvement in
terms of international efficiency in this environment.  Still, perhaps WTO subsidy rules “do no
harm.”  We assess this possibility in the next section. 
IV.  The WTO Subsidy Rules 
IV.1 Institutional Background
As described in section II.1, from early in its history, governments were dissatisfied with the
treatment of subsidies within GATT.  This dissatisfaction led to the negotiation of increasingly
stringent rules in an attempt to discipline the use of subsidies.  The 1979 GATT Subsidies Code
negotiated in the Tokyo Round was an attempt to strengthen GATT rules on subsidies, and the WTO
SCM Agreement and the WTO Agreement on Agriculture represent attempts to bring further teeth
17These three new features are also present in the Agriculture Agreement.   
18Lawrence (2003, pp. 54-60) emphasizes the new “compliance” orientation of the WTO subsidy rules as
marking a fundamental shift from the traditional  “concession rebalancing” orientation of the GATT.
19A fourth important difference is the “specificity” requirement that a subsidy must meet to be challenged under
the SCM Agreement.  As the x-sector production subsidy that we consider would satisfy this requirement automatically,
we do not emphasize this difference here, though in practice the requirement of specificity is considered to be the critical
“gateway” to the SCM provisions.  
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to subsidy disciplines within the WTO.  In light of our above findings, the WTO attempts to
discipline domestic subsidies which are embodied in the SCM and Agriculture Agreements are
particularly noteworthy, because these agreements depart in several important ways from the basic
features that are associated with reliance on NV claims as a way to discipline subsidies, features that
receive formal support under Propositions 1 and 2.  
Focusing on the SCM Agreement, we may identify three key differences in the way domestic
subsidies are treated under this agreement relative to their treatment in non-violation complaints.17
First, a subsidy that is successfully challenged under the SCM Agreement must be removed to
achieve compliance (i.e., subsidy complaints under the SCM Agreement are “violation” complaints),
whereas under an NV claim the subsidizing government would simply be expected to make a policy
adjustment that returned market access to its original level – it would be under no obligation to
remove the subsidy.18  Second, there is no distinction in the SCM Agreement between “new”
subsidies and subsidies that were known to exist at the time of market access negotiations.  And
third, there is no requirement that a government challenging a subsidy under the SCM Agreement
had previously negotiated a tariff commitment.  Together, these three differences sever the link
between subsidies that may be challenged within the WTO and market access expectations that are
upset, and imply that any government has the right to challenge – and, in principle, force the
removal of – virtually any positive subsidy (see Sykes, forthcoming, for a similar assessment).19
To capture the additional features embodied in the WTO subsidy rules, we introduce into the
GATT Subsidy Game the ability to challenge a subsidy afforded under the SCM Agreement.  We
accomplish this by inserting a new stage, between stages 2 and 3 of the GATT Subsidy Game, in
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which the foreign government may choose to challenge a domestic subsidy under the SCM
Agreement.  The general features of this augmented game, which we refer to as the WTO Subsidy
Game, are as follows:
Stage 1: The home and foreign governments negotiate tariff levels , and a stage-1 market-
clearing world price  is implied by  and the existing domestic subsidy
and tax policies . 
Stage 2: The home government chooses domestic policies , and a stage-2 market-clearing world
price  is implied.
Stage 3: If , then the foreign government chooses whether or not to challenge the subsidy under
the SCM Agreement.  If the subsidy is challenged, then , and the home government may
choose again its domestic tax .
Stage 4: If the conditions for an NV claim are met, then the foreign government chooses whether
or not to make an NV claim; if the conditions for a CVD response are met, then the foreign
government chooses whether or not to impose a CVD.
In effect, as compared with the GATT Subsidy Game, the WTO Subsidy Game introduces
an option for the foreign government to choose to have a positive domestic subsidy removed with
an SCM challenge, rather than respond to the subsidy with an NV claim or a CVD.  We now turn
in the next subsection to consider the impact of the WTO Subsidy Rules on negotiating outcomes.
IV.2 The (In)Efficiency of Outcomes under WTO Subsidy Rules
We continue to allow that an NV claim is costly, but we carry out our analysis of the WTO
Subsidy Game under the assumption that there is no cost to challenging a subsidy under the SCM
Agreement.  In analogy with our analysis of the GATT Subsidy Game, given the existing production
and consumption policies of the home government, we will say that a particular pair of payoffs for
the home and foreign governments can be implemented under WTO tariff negotiations if there exists
a pair of negotiated tariff levels  such that this payoff pair corresponds to a SGPE of stages
2-4 of the WTO Subsidy Game.
We first consider whether the stage-1 negotiating outcome that implements an efficient
20This can be seen as follows: since the SCM challenge sets , there can be no CVD response in stage 4; if
the resulting market-clearing world price is equal to , then there is no stage-4 (NV or CVD) response and the foreign
payoff is ; if the resulting market-clearing world price is less than , then a stage-4 NV claim
is triggered and foreign welfare is . 
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policy combination under GATT tariff negotiations can implement this efficient policy combination
under WTO tariff negotiations as well.  Consider, then, any policy combination  on
the Contracting Frontier.  Defining  implicitly by , recalling that  satisfies
, and letting , we observed previously that
 is equivalent to the alternative (efficient) policy combination , and
that the stage-1 negotiating outcome of  would implement this efficient policy
combination under GATT tariff negotiations (leading to Proposition 2).  
Now suppose that stage-1 negotiations in the WTO Subsidy Game result in the tariff pair
, so that the implied stage-1 market-clearing world price is then .  Consider
the home government’s stage-2 problem.  If it selects  and the foreign government
chooses in stage 3 not to challenge the subsidy under the SCM Agreement, then as with the GATT
Subsidy Game the welfare levels associated with the efficient policy combination 
will be implemented.  Moreover, any alternative stage-2 choice that does not elicit a stage-3
challenge under the SCM Agreement cannot be preferred by the home government, by arguments
exactly analogous to those made in the context of the GATT Subsidy Game.  Finally, the home
government cannot gain from an alternative stage-2 choice that does elicit a stage-3 challenge under
the SCM Agreement, since doing so simply restricts the level of  to 1, from which arguments
exactly analogous to those made in the context of the GATT Subsidy Game again apply. 
Hence, the key question is whether or not a stage-1 negotiating outcome of ,
followed by a stage-2 selection of , will elicit a stage-3 challenge of the subsidy
under the SCM Agreement.  If the foreign government chooses not to bring an SCM challenge in
stage 3, then its payoff is .  If the foreign government chooses to bring an SCM
challenge in stage 3, then its payoff can be greater than  only if the resulting
market-clearing world price is greater than .20  Fixing  and noting that  varies
21This can be seen as follows: with  sufficiently large, the increase in  required to preserve the implied
market-clearing world price at  when the restriction  is imposed can be made arbitrarily large; and therefore
under global concavity and with  placing the home government close to its best-response policies, a
sufficiently large  ensures that, when  is imposed and beginning from a level of  that implies a market-clearing
world price slightly above , the cost of raising  to achieve  is not worth incurring for the home government.
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with , we observe that, for  and sufficiently large, our global concavity assumption
ensures that the restriction to  implied by an SCM challenge will not be met by an increase in 
from the home government that preserves the implied world price at , at least for 
where the home government is positioned near its best-response policies.21  For  and
sufficiently large, then, the market-clearing world price resulting from an SCM challenge is greater
than , at least for efficient policies that position the home government near its best-response
policies.  Provided the increase in  is not too large, which is guaranteed provided that 
is not too large, the foreign government must then gain from the SCM challenge (as implied by
(C1)), and the efficient policies are not implemented with a stage-1 negotiating outcome of
. 
Finally, we observe that, when the stage-1 negotiating outcome of  fails to
implement the efficient policy combination  in the WTO Subsidy Game, there can be
no other stage-1 negotiating outcome that will work.  This is because  must be set so as to provide
the appropriate NV trigger, tying down the unique combination of policies that yield the welfare
levels implied by , i.e., the requirements of NV imply that there is no policy
redundancy that can be exploited to meet the demands for achieving efficiency.  We therefore state:
Proposition 3: Whether or not NV claims are costly, there exists a range of outcomes on the
Contracting Frontier that cannot be implemented under WTO tariff negotiations. 
When viewed together, Propositions 2 and 3 suggest that the subsidy rules embodied in the
WTO SCM Agreement represent a step backward relative to the GATT subsidy rules.  In effect, the
available policy instruments are just sufficient to allow governments to meet the demands for
efficient outcomes in the GATT Subsidy Game.  When the additional restrictions on the use of
subsidies embodied in the SCM Agreement are introduced, the available instruments are insufficient
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to meet the added demands for efficient outcomes – at least over a range of outcomes on the
international efficiency frontier – in the resulting WTO Subsidy Game.  
V. Limited Domestic Policy Instruments
Until now we have maintained the assumption that the domestic government possesses a set
of policy instruments that is sufficiently rich to exhibit a degree of redundancy, and we have
observed that this policy redundancy plays a potentially important role in facilitating internationally
efficient outcomes under GATT subsidy rules.  We now consider briefly a world in which the policy
redundancy featured in the previous sections does not arise.  Specifically, we assume in this section
that the home government has a tariff and a domestic production subsidy at its disposal, but we now
eliminate the domestic consumption tax (i.e., we set ).  This restriction on policy instruments
can be interpreted as representing a  limitation that governments may face when they attempt to
offset – with adjustments in their domestic policies – the effects of international constraints on
policy instruments imposed as a result of GATT/WTO commitments.  Owing to the initial policy
redundancy, this restriction, of course, does not alter the welfare combinations that correspond to
the efficiency frontier or the non-cooperative (Nash) equilibrium, though it does make the associated
policy combinations unique.  Moreover, it is straightforward to confirm that Lemmas 1-6 continue
to hold when .  But as we next demonstrate, the elimination of policy redundancy has important
implications for the efficiency properties of outcomes under GATT and WTO subsidy rules.
V.1 GATT Subsidy Rules in a Limited-Instrument Environment
We consider first the efficiency properties of the outcomes of the GATT Subsidy Game in
the presence of limited domestic policy instruments, concentrating on the case where NV is costly.
When NV is costly, the efficiency frontier cannot be attained if an NV claim is filed, and so we need
only ask whether a point on the Contracting Frontier can be implemented under GATT tariff
negotiations when an NV claim is not triggered.  
Suppose, then, that a policy combination on the Contracting Frontier has been reached as the
outcome of the GATT Subsidy Game.  There are two possible paths to this outcome, corresponding
to whether a CVD response is triggered or not.  If a CVD response is triggered, then by Lemma 4
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we have that , and by Lemma 6 it then follows that a small increase in  above  would
not trigger an NV response from the foreign government, and would lead to a reduction of  below 
under the permissible CVD response (i.e., letting  denote the CVD response, ).
But then the home government gains from deviating to , since at a point on the Contracting
Frontier we have  by the proof of Lemma 1 and  by the proof of
Lemma 2 (see Appendix).  The remaining possibility is that a CVD response is not triggered.  In this
case, the efficient tariffs  and  must be chosen in stage 1.  Moreover, owing to the lack of
policy redundancy, as we observed above there is now a unique combination of policies associated
with any point on the efficiency frontier.  Hence, in light of the domestic production subsidy  that
exists at the time of the stage-1 choices, a unique stage-1 market clearing price of 
is implied, with the unique stage-2 market clearing price then given by .  Finally,
recalling the definition of  and observing that it is a function of ,  and , it follows
(generically) that the implied .  But using Lemmas 5 and 6, we then have that either a (costly)
NV claim would be triggered along this path to the efficient policy combination, thereby precluding
efficiency, or that the home government could deviate from the efficient policy combination to 
without triggering an NV claim from the foreign government and thereby gain.  
As a consequence of these arguments, we may state:
Proposition 4: In the presence of limited domestic policy instruments and costly NV claims, there
does not exist (generically) a point on the Contracting Frontier that can be implemented under
GATT tariff negotiations.
In effect, as a comparison of Propositions 2 and 4 makes clear, a level of policy redundancy
is required to achieve efficient outcomes under GATT tariff negotiations when NV is costly: when
the set of domestic policy instruments is limited and this redundancy is not present, there are too few
instruments for governments to orchestrate a movement from inefficient non-cooperative (Nash)
policies to a place on the efficiency frontier under GATT subsidy rules.  Notice, too, that the
inability to reach efficient outcomes stems from the ineffectiveness of the “disciplines” placed on
the use of subsidies by costly NV claims in the presence of limited domestic policy instruments.
This gives rise to the possibility that alternative disciplines on subsidies, such as those embodied in
29
the SCM Agreement, could be “more effective,” and as such facilitate more efficient outcomes.
V.2 WTO Subsidy Rules in a Limited Instrument Environment
In light of Proposition 4, it is now fairly direct to identify a set of circumstances in which
WTO subsidy rules mark an improvement over GATT subsidy rules in a limited-instrument
environment, namely, when subsidies are of sufficiently minor importance on the efficiency frontier.
To see that WTO subsidy rules must lead to more efficient outcomes than GATT subsidy rules in
these circumstances, consider the extreme case in which there is no role for a domestic production
subsidy at any point on the international efficiency frontier.  This would be true, for example, if the
home government’s objective were simply to maximize the real value of national income, and there
were no distortions in the domestic economy.  In this case, any point on the Contracting Frontier can
be implemented under WTO tariff negotiations, by simply negotiating in stage 1 to the efficient
tariffs  and  associated with the desired point on the efficiency frontier: by challenging any 
under the SCM Agreement, the foreign government can guarantee that the efficient point will be
implemented; and by the efficiency of , the home government cannot find a  that is
preferred by it and the foreign government (and therefore not challenged under the SCM
Agreement).  Since (generically) no point on the Contracting Frontier can be implemented under
GATT tariff negotiations in these circumstances according to Proposition 4, it follows that WTO
subsidy rules must lead to more efficient outcomes than GATT subsidy rules in these circumstances.
At the other extreme, as we show in our working paper (Bagwell and Staiger, 2004), if the
role of production subsidies in an internationally efficient policy environment is sufficiently
important, then the WTO subsidy rules can completely undermine the ability of tariff negotiations
to provide governments with an avenue of escape from the non-cooperative (Nash) equilibrium, and
in these circumstances GATT subsidy rules must surely lead to more efficient outcomes than WTO
subsidy rules. In effect, if governments consider domestic subsidies to be a sufficiently vital policy
instrument, they may be less inclined to negotiate tariff commitments under the subsidy rules of the
WTO, since such commitments may increase the likelihood that their subsidies will be challenged
under the SCM Agreement.  In this way, the SCM Agreement may have a “chilling” effect on the
desire of governments to take on market access commitments through WTO negotiations.
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To understand this chilling effect, observe that the foreign government gets more from an
SCM challenge of the home government’s subsidy when the home government has bound its tariff
in a stage-1 tariff negotiation, because the home government is then unable to adjust its tariff to
compensate for the loss of its subsidy instrument (and in this limited instrument environment it has
no other instruments to adjust either).  But this raises the possibility that the home government may
be able to avoid a subsequent SCM challenge of its subsidy if it refuses to bind its tariff in stage 1
negotiations.  When this is the case, the home government then confronts a choice between securing
its non-cooperative (Nash) welfare – which it receives if it refuses to negotiate in stage 1 and thereby
avoids an SCM challenge to its subsidy – and receiving the welfare it can secure from negotiated
tariff levels but without the use of its subsidy instrument.  If preserving the use of the domestic
production subsidy is sufficiently valuable from the perspective of international efficiency, then
elimination of this instrument results in a “tariffs-only” international efficiency frontier that lies
below the non-cooperative (Nash) point that arises when the subsidy instrument is available to the
home government.  And in this case, no stage-1 tariff agreement is possible. 
An example can help illustrate this last point.  Consider a 2-good endowment world economy
similar to that of Kennan and Riezman (1988), extended  to allow for the use of production subsidies
as well as tariffs.  The foreign country is endowed with  units of good x and  units of good
y.  If the representative agent in the foreign country consumes  units of x and  units of y, its
utility is .  With  denoting the relative foreign price, it is direct to show that
the foreign price in autarky is given by .  The home region is composed of a continuum
of small identical countries indexed by .  The endowment of x in the range of home countries
dh is , and this endowment is owned by the type-1 agents of these countries, while the
endowment of y in the range of home countries dh is , and this endowment is owned by the
type-2 agents of these countries.  If a type-1 agent consumes  units of x and  units of y, its
utility is .  Type-2 agents, by contrast, consume only good x, and if a type-2 agent
consumes  units of x, its utility is .  With  denoting the relative home price, it is
direct to show that the price in autarky in a representative home country is given by .
We impose the parameter restriction , which implies  and therefore ensures that,
if trade is allowed and conforms with comparative advantage, the representative home country will
22As can be confirmed from (7) below,  ensures that the Nash foreign tariff is finite.
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be an importer of x and the foreign country will be an importer of y.22  
We next describe the trading equilibrium between the home and foreign countries.  The
foreign government has at its disposal an import tariff .  With , we then have 
for any non-prohibitive .  The foreign government selects  to maximize the utility of its
representative agent, , which can be expressed as 
(5) ,
with  the market clearing world price.  The government of a representative home country has at
its disposal both a tariff  and a production subsidy .  Its corresponding price relationships for non-
prohibitive choices of  and  are given by  and .  We assume that revenue from
intervention in a representative home country is redistributed across its type-1 and type-2 agents as
in Mayer (1984), so that the ith agent’s share of revenue is its share of factor income.  We assume
further that the government of a representative home country operates under a rigid political
constraint, according to which it cannot allow international trade to alter the relative incomes of its
type-1 and type-2 agents from their relation in autarky.  This constraint amounts to the requirement
that .  Subject to this constraint, the representative home government is assumed to select its
instruments to maximize , which after substituting the constraint can be expressed as  
(6) .
Exploiting the fact that the representative home country is small and therefore takes  as fixed
when selecting its tariff and production subsidy, it is direct to calculate that the unique interior Nash
equilibrium between the home and foreign countries is characterized by  
(7) ;  ;     ; .
23This statement and the statement immediately preceding it assume that the tariff agreement preserves the
pattern of trade according to comparative advantage.  But the conclusion remains valid as well for agreements that flip
the pattern of trade between home and foreign countries, with the roles of goods x and y then simply reversed.  
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Consider next the Nash equilibrium in home and foreign tariffs that would arise if , so
that no home country were permitted to utilize its production subsidy.  In this case, we may observe
that the representative home country must then have , and so the constraint  demands
 and hence no trade.  That is, the unique Nash tariff equilibrium when  entails autarky, and
we observe as well that this corresponds to a point on the tariffs-only efficiency frontier.  Since the
foreign government achieves greater welfare in the interior Nash equilibrium than under autarky,
we may also observe that, if the representative home government refuses to bind its tariff in stage
1 of the WTO Subsidy Game, it avoids an SCM challenge to its subsidy and thereby secures its
interior Nash payoff.  That is, the foreign government will not bring an SCM challenge against home
subsidies in stage 3 if the home tariff is not bound in stage 1, and so the disagreement payoff for a
representative home government in the WTO Subsidy game is its interior Nash payoff. 
As a consequence of these observations, we may conclude that the representative home
government will not accept any stage-1 tariff agreement in the WTO Subsidy Game under which
a stage-3 SCM challenge is anticipated.  It is also direct to show using (5) and (7) that the home
tariff must be bound below 1 if the foreign government is to gain from any stage-1 tariff agreement
that does not lead to a stage-3 SCM challenge.  A remaining question is then whether there exists
a stage-1 tariff agreement with  bound below 1 that does not lead to a stage-3 SCM challenge.  This
question may be answered in two steps.  First, since the subsidy is used in a representative home
country to redistribute income from type-2 agents (who consume only the import good x) to type-1
agents (who consume both x and y), the subsidy serves to reduce the aggregate demand for the
imported good x in the representative home country, and hence a stage-3 SCM challenge that
removes these subsidies serves to increase home-country demand for the imported good x and
thereby raise .  And second, using (5) it may be confirmed  that the foreign government gains
from any such rise in .23  Therefore, there does not exist a stage-1 tariff agreement with  bound
below 1 in which a stage-3 SCM challenge is not brought, and hence we may conclude that no stage-
1 tariff agreement is possible in the WTO Subsidy Game in this example. 
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Figure 2 illustrates.  With the utility of a representative home government on the vertical axis
and the utility of the foreign government on the horizontal axis, the interior Nash utilities are
depicted by the point labeled N, while the (full-instrument) efficiency frontier is labeled .  The
autarky utility levels associated with the Nash tariff equilibrium when  are depicted by the point
labeled , and as we note above this is also a point on the tariffs-only efficiency frontier.  As
we have explained: N is the disagreement point for stage-1 tariff negotiations in the WTO Subsidy
Game; therefore, any stage-1 agreement under which a stage-3 SCM challenge can be anticipated
is infeasible, since such an agreement could only rest on the tariffs-only efficiency frontier at point
, which lies below point N; but  must be bound below 1 if the foreign government is to gain
from a stage-1 agreement that does not trigger a stage-3 SCM challenge; and under any stage-1
agreement that binds  below 1, a stage-3 SCM challenge may be anticipated.  Hence, the Nash
point N depicts the unique equilibrium of the WTO Subsidy Game in this example.
     
Returning now to our more general treatment, our discussion of the limited-instrument costly
NV environment may be summarized as follows.  If domestic subsidies have no reason to exist in
an internationally efficient policy setting, then, by allowing these subsidies to be challenged and
removed, the “more effective” discipline introduced under the WTO SCM Agreement is sure to be
efficiency enhancing relative to the weaker subsidy disciplines embodied in GATT rules.  It is
notable, however, that these circumstances are strikingly at odds with the views expressed by
GATT/WTO member governments concerning the legitimate role of subsidies in the pursuit of
important public policy objectives (see note 2).  Whether WTO subsidy rules can be said to mark
an improvement over GATT subsidy rules in this environment when subsidies are instead seen as
legitimate instruments of public policy is more difficult to establish, and presumably depends on
circumstances.  On the one hand, the heightened ability to challenge and remove subsidies that erode
market access commitments can work to enhance international efficiency.  On the other hand, the
ability to challenge and remove subsidies that have a legitimate purpose in an internationally
efficient policy environment can work against international efficiency.  At a general level, then,
whether or not the WTO subsidy rules mark an improvement over GATT subsidy rules in this
limited-instrument costly-NV environment depends on the relative importance of these two forces.
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VI. Conclusion
International disputes over subsidies are becoming increasingly prominent in the world
trading system.  Yet the international rules that govern subsidies have received little attention in the
form of systematic economic analysis.  In this paper we have provided a first formal analysis of the
international rules that govern the use of subsidies to domestic production.  Our analysis highlights
the impact of the new disciplines on subsidies that were added to GATT rules with the creation of
the WTO.  Though GATT subsidy rules were seen as weak and inadequate while the WTO subsidy
rules are viewed as a significant strengthening of multilateral disciplines on subsidies, we find that
the key changes introduced by the WTO subsidy rules may ultimately do more harm than good to
the multilateral trading system, by undermining the ability of tariff negotiations to serve as the
mechanism for expanding market access to more efficient levels.
The possibility that WTO subsidy rules could have a “chilling” effect on the desire of
governments to make further market access commitments through WTO negotiations reflects a
possible resolution of the tension between a system of rules that now places more stringent limits
on subsidies than on tariffs and the basic message of the Bhagwati-Johnson-Ramaswami targeting
principle.  This tension arises because, according to the targeting principle, production subsidies are
typically a better policy instrument  for achieving production goals than are tariffs, but according
to WTO rules, tariffs rather than production subsidies may be the only permissible instrument
available to WTO-member governments.  As we have observed above, one possible resolution of
this tension is that governments may refrain from accepting negotiated limits on their use of tariffs,
if their ability to utilize production subsidies without challenge under WTO subsidy rules is thereby
enhanced.
This paper raises at least as many questions as it answers.  Among the most important
questions are: (i) A central efficiency-enhancing role is suggested for the right to bring NV claims,
but we have modeled these claims stylistically.  Does this central role survive when the nature of
NV claims is modeled more precisely?; (ii) Our results do not indicate that any efficiency-enhancing
role is played by the right to impose CVDs.  What role, if any, do CVDs play in facilitating efficient
policy outcomes in a richer setting?; (iii) Our results indicate that a crucial feature upon which the
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impacts of GATT and WTO subsidy rules hinges is the richness of the set of available domestic
policy instruments.  Are governments in fact better characterized as possessing redundant sets of
policy instruments or facing more limited policy options?; and finally, (iv) Our results suggest that
the WTO Subsidy rules may mark a step backward, in the sense that they may lead to less efficient
outcomes than were possible under the GATT subsidy rules.  If one accepts this suggestion, then a
natural question is, How could this (inferior) change have been agreed to by GATT/WTO members?
These are important questions for future work.  Here we comment briefly on two of them.
First, regarding a more precise modeling of NV claims, we have modeled NV claims here as
preserving the level of market access commitments implied by tariff negotiations.  More accurately,
as Petersmann (1977, p. 172) explains, in combination with renegotiation rights the NV claims
operate to preserve the balance of market access commitments implied by tariff negotiations.  This
suggests that a more precise modeling of NV claims requires as well the introduction of
renegotiation opportunities, along the lines pursued in Bagwell and Staiger (2001b) in the context
of domestic standards.  A similar analysis in the context of subsidies could be illuminating.  Second,
regarding the possibility that an inferior change in subsidy rules could have been agreed to by the
GATT/WTO members, one explanation builds from the observation by Sykes (forthcoming), that
a major limitation of GATT subsidy disciplines as perceived by member governments was their
inability to address third-country issues.  These issues do not arise in our 2-country model, but in
a 3-country environment it can be seen that GATT’s reliance on NV claims to discipline subsidies
that upset market access expectations would be effective only if these claims extended to third
parties, so that for example country A could file an NV claim against country B’s subsidy if B’s
subsidy upset A’s expected access to country C’s market.  Under GATT, NV claims were not
interpreted to extend to third parties in this way, and as Sykes explains the WTO subsidy disciplines
were introduced in large part to achieve this third-party reach.  Under this explanation, our results
indicate that a more appropriate fix would have been to simply extend the reach of NV claims to
third parties.  
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Appendix
Lemma 1: Let  denote a point on the Contracting Frontier, and let
.  Then for any , .
Proof: We begin by observing that, at a point on the Contracting Frontier, we cannot have
 or : otherwise, under (C1), governments would agree on the direction of
movement in a tariff which each would strictly prefer, and the initial policies could not then be
internationally efficient.  Moreover, as international efficiency requires the tangency condition 
 ,
it follows that at a point on the Contracting Frontier we cannot have  or .
Therefore, any point on the Contracting Frontier must satisfy
(A1)  .
In addition, notice that , and so with  it follows that
 implies .  As a consequence, beginning from a  policy combination
 on the Contracting Frontier, any set of small changes in the policies of the domestic
government  that reduce  from its implied level  will reduce the
welfare of the foreign government.  Under our global concavity assumption, the statement of Lemma
1 then follows. QED
Lemma 2:  Let  denote a point on the Contracting Frontier, and let
 and  for any ,  and .  Then for any ,  and
 implying , .
Proof: Using the market-clearing condition (3), it may be confirmed that 
(A2) .
Moreover, it may also be confirmed that the first-order conditions that define the international
efficiency frontier imply: 
(A3) , 
which says that the domestic government must be indifferent to small changes in  and  that
preserve the market-clearing world price .  An implication of (A3) is that, with  and
,  starting from any point on the international efficiency frontier .
But by (A2), we also have that 
,
and thus at a point on the efficiency frontier satisfying (C1), we must also have  and
.  As a consequence, beginning from a point  that rests on the Contracting
Frontier, it follows that
  as ,
and therefore that any set of small changes in the domestic policies of the home government 
that increase  from its implied level  will reduce the welfare of the home
government.  Combined with our finding (A1) in the proof of Lemma 1 above that  and
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